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Preamble
In this case study, we investigate the success of fair trade pioneer Cafédirect. We explore the
brand’s marketing, networks and communications channels which have lead to its rapid
growth from niche player to a mainstream brand. However, we also identify a distinct
slowdown in this growth, particularly in its core retail coffee market, and explore whether
Cafédirect has reached its natural limit for the growth as an ethical brand.
The case was drawn from both a review of existing literature and two longitudinal studies
carried out between 1999-2004 and 1999-2009. For those interested in more details of our
trail of evidence gathered during the development and writing of this case, please see
Appendix 1 where we outline our methodology in more detail. However, since this case is
designed to be read as a story, we have deliberately suppressed many of the sources of our
company insights in order to maintain a consistent narrative.
We are not the first people to investigate the marketing of Cafédirect (Low and Davenport,
2005, McDonagh, 2002, Nichols and Opal, 2005 and Wright, 2004) nor to look at the
importance of networks in fair trade (Davies, 2008, Raynolds, Murray and Taylor, 2004) or
even the effects of mainstreaming in the industry (Davies, 2007, Doherty and Tranchell,
2007, Moore, 2004, Golding and Peattie, 2005, Wilkinson, 2007). However, through our in-
depth investigation of the company, its supply chain, customers and general marketplace
dynamics over time, we can provide a critical examination of what has lead to the success of
the brand and where the limits of its expansion might lie.
Since the success of Cafédirect has made a significant contribution to the mainstreaming of
fair trade in the UK (Nicholls and Opal, 2005), the lessons from this case study are important
to other companies utilising ethical claims to compete in the mainstream.
Fair trade or Fairtrade©
Fair trade is a trading partnership based on dialogue, transparency and respect that seeks
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers.
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among consumers and campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional
international trade (FINE, 2001). It started initially with the importation of craft and
household goods from under-developed countries by charities and religious organisations for
sale in wealthier countries, especially Western Europe. Products such as the Argentinean pin
cushion sold through Oxfam in the 1960s and the Bangladeshi wicker baskets from Traidcraft
in the 1970s and 1980s are good early examples of fair trade products where retailers paid a
higher price directly to the producer and, where applicable, they assisted producer
communities with social, environmental and economic issues they were facing. This
continued through the 1980s with increasing numbers of products, sometimes of dubious
quality, being imported for sale through specialist retailers (often called World Shops) or
through mail order catalogues, such as the Traidcraft catalogue. Up until the early 90s, fair
trade was unbranded, mostly not-audited and its products were fondly remembered as……
“disgusting” (referring to the coffee), “poorly made and pointless” (referring to the craft
products) and “gosh, another basket…. how are you going to sell this?” (From the daughter
of a Traidcraft Rep).
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a parallel stream of fair trade goods appeared in World
Shops which offered commodity products such as coffee, tea and sugar, for general
consumption. They followed a much more structured, audited and labelled method of
identifying fair trade products. These included the first fair trade coffee product, Max
Havelaar, that was formally audited and labelled for sale in Northern Europe, and Campaign
Coffee sold in the UK by mail order (later rebranded to Equal Exchange). In 1991, the
Fairtrade Foundation (FtF) was created by a number of charities, including Oxfam, Christian
Aid and the World Development Movement. Its responsibility was to oversee the Fairtrade©
Mark (See Figures 1a and 1b). It does this by awarding the Mark to products that have had
their supply chain audited to ensure they adhere to the standards laid down by the world fair
trade governing organisation; the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO). It is the FLO that
sets the standards for Fairtrade© commodity products and a separate body, FLO-CERT,
which conducts the supply chain audit; for ease of communications, we will refer to these
related bodies as the FLO.
4Although there are a great number of fair trade goods which do not carry the Fairtrade© Mark
(especially crafts and clothing), Cafédirect adopted the Fairtrade© certification in setting up
its brand. As a result, we will focus primarily on these FLO certification standards here rather
than of the others offered by organisations such as the International Federation for Alternative
Trade (IFAT), European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and Network of European World
Shops (NEWS).
The FLO standards aim to ensure both better working conditions and more sustainable
farming practice in grower communities. As coffee and tea prices are volatile, the FLO sets
minimum market prices (floor price) that are paid for Fairtrade© certified products to cover
the cost of production. For example, the Fairtrade© minimum prices for different types of
coffee beans are as follows: Arabica coffee = 131 US cents/lb; Arabica organic coffee= 151
US cents/lb; Robusta coffee =111 US cents/lb; Robusta organic coffee =131 US cents/lb (in
November, 2008). Whenever the world market prices go above these minimum prices;
Fairtrade© also guarantees a higher-than-market price to growers through an additional
“social premium” of between 5-15 cents per kg, depending on the product. For coffee, this
equates to paying the market price plus 10 US cents/lb. Through these two pricing
mechanisms, Fairtrade© aims to guarantee a long term, sustainable commitment to its
growers, giving them more opportunity to plan for the future and to invest in their farms and
communities.
Following the introduction of fair trade labelling, fair trade evolved rapidly both in terms of
sales and public awareness. With increasing levels of institutionalization, it has established
itself as one of the major initiatives to pursue social purposes using market mechanisms, i.e.
poverty alleviation for small-scale producers in the South through sales for products in the
Figure 1a: Fairtrade Mark
(1992-2001)
Figure 1b: Fairtrade Mark
(2001- )
5North1 (Moore, 2004; Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Raynolds et al, 2007). Nicholls and Opal
(2005) propose that fair trade is a new business approach that looks holistically at the supply
chain to address market failures and their social impacts at source whilst acknowledging the
need for profitability.
Worldwide, consumers spent over £1.6 billion on Fairtrade© Marked products in 2007, with
over 7.5 million producers and workers across 58 developing countries benefiting (FLO,
2008). A number of authors (e.g. Golding and Peattie, 2005, Lowe and Davenport, 2005a and
2005b, Moore, Gibbon and Slack, 2006; Nicholls and Opal, 2005) identify the
mainstreaming2 of fair trade through the successful branding of fair trade companies, such as
Cafédirect and Divine Chocolate, as a key factor in the rise of such products. However, the
mainstreaming of fair trade produce is not without its critics.
The Pros and Cons of Mainstreaming Fair Trade
A number of authors have reported on the positive arguments for Fairtrade© Marked products
being in the mainstream because of increased sales which benefit a larger number of
marginalised producers, and the opportunity to reach a wider audience with the fair trade
message (Lowe and Davenport 2005a, 2005b, Nicholls and Opal, 2005). In fact, earlier
research on fair trade highlights the problem of poor availability in supermarkets as a limiting
factor in the growth of fair trade sales (Nicholls 2002, Nicholls and Opal 2005, Ronchi 2001
and Strong 1997). Furthermore, Teather (2006) argues that the involvement of major retailers
has been a key factor in the growth and Taylor et al (2005) suggest the new corporate interest
in fair trade is an indication that fair trade has succeeded in demonstrating that the market
should reward socially just and environmentally sound practices. Today, more than 4,500 fair
trade products are available in the mainstream UK market (Fairtrade Foundation 2007). These
products have entered the mainstream via a number of differing entry routes including:
 Branded fair trade products from 100% Fair Trade Companies such as Cafédirect and
Divine Chocolate Ltd. All products from these companies carry the Fairtrade© Mark.
 Branded Products from Fair Trade Adopters where significant part of their product
portfolio is Fairtrade© Marked products e.g. Clipper Teas, Green and Blacks
Chocolate, Percol Coffee Company.
 Line extensions from Fair Trade Branders where they are large, mainstream
organisations wishing to have ethical products in their portfolio e.g. Fyffes (one of the
6five largest global fresh produce distributors which supply’s Tesco with own label
bananas), Nestlé and Billingtons (Europe’s leading supplier of unrefined cane sugar).
 Retailer Own Label Fair Trade products from suppliers such as Tesco own-label fair
trade coffee. These products sit on the shelf alongside branded fair trade products.
 Fair trade products from retailers Marks and Spencer and Starbucks Coffee Company
who only stock their own brand products.
(Davies 2007; Doherty and Tranchell 2007).
According to the Economist (2006), the decision to buy fair trade products in grocery stores
sends out a very clear political message. A number of authors agree that consumers act
neither as a purely economic agent nor as purely political agent, but as a mixture of the two;
with consumers whose identity, beliefs and practices aim to address the economic imbalances
highlighted by the fair trade movement (Parker 1999, Urry, 1995). Connolly and Shaw (2006)
suggest that many ethical consumers believe they are part of a wider collective of concerned
consumers, although acting individually. It is interesting to note that in a Market & Opinion
Research International Ltd. (MORI) survey on fair trade awareness, 43% of those aware of
fair trade were first made aware of what it stands for whilst shopping (MORI 2005). Strong
(1996, 1997) also identified communicating the human element of sustainability as one of the
key challenges for fair trade companies wishing to develop a mainstream position. This is
important if fair trade companies are to avoid social/environmental qualities becoming
subordinated to just price. Moore et al. (2006) argue the fair trade products in the mainstream
need to work on the depth of the fair trade message to avoid it being seen just as a lifestyle
choice, something we will explore later through Cafédirect advertising.
Despite the growth in fair trade, a number of authors warn that uncritical engagement with
mainstream business risks absorption and dilution of the fair trade movement (Lowe and
Davenport 2005a, 2005b, Moore et al 2006, Murray et al 2006, Taylor et al 2005). This can
lead to ‘clean-wash’ which occurs when a company “derives positive benefits from its
association with the fair trade movement, however minimal its efforts to live the values”
(Murray and Raynolds 2000:p68-69). Moore et al (2006) also highlight the possibility that
corporate commitment to fair trade may only be temporary. Taylor et al (2005) argue that
corporations cannot be expected to have the same levels of interest and commitment that
inspired the creation of the fair trade system, as evidenced by the proliferation of other ethical
7labels outside the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) system which do not demonstrate
the equivalent social standards. The Fairtrade© labelling system does not differentiate
between organisations which are solely fair trade companies with direct links with producers,
and the larger corporations whose fair trade commitment is only a small percentage of their
sales. Raynolds et al (2007) propose that one of the challenges facing fair trade organisations
will be to ensure it is not just about increasing prices but also maintaining a transformative
alternative system with people and the environment at its centre. Low and Davenport (2005a
and 2005b) argue that fair trade in the mainstream has already shifted the message from
participation in an international programme of trade reform to individualised shopping for a
better world by focussing mainly on the dimensions of fair price for producers and product
quality.
Nestlé’s 2005 UK launch of its fair trade coffee, Partners Blend, has brought this debate of
‘clean-wash’ into sharp focus (Cookson 2005) as the company still occupies the top spot in
the Ethical Consumer Organisation’s list of boycotted brands, largely due to its aggressive
marketing of baby milk powder in developing countries. Nestlé makes no secret of the
commercial reasons for its decision to launch a fair trade product and aims to target the semi-
ethical segment. According to Tallontire et al (2001), semi-ethical consumers are infrequent
purchasers of ethical goods who may be persuaded to buy more if the goods were made more
attractive or more easily available to them. Currently, Partners Blend makes up only 0.2% of
the Nestlé coffee range, with the remainder of its coffee being bought at the prevailing world
market price. However, it claims that there are just not enough fair trade coffee producers to
switch production to fair trade for its major lines.
Fair trade brand pioneers like Cafedirect and Divine Chocolate are partly-owned by producer
groups with producer representatives on the Boards of these companies in unique governance
arrangements. Doherty and Tranchell (2007) argue that these fair trade companies as
examples of radical mainstreaming that can actually strengthen the transformative message of
fair trade. By investigating such companies through the type of longitudinal study reported
here, we can gain greater insights into the impacts of mainstreaming on the fair trade
ideology, and the growing pains of fair trade and other similar social initiatives as they
emerge from their grass roots to mainstream, highly visibility organisations.
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The International Coffee Agreement which controlled the price of coffee beans collapsed in
1989. This caused the price of coffee beans to fall to a third of its pre-1989 level within a few
years and had a devastating effect on the incomes of small-scale coffee farmers globally
(Brown, 2007). Three quarters of the global supply of coffee is produced by small, family
owned farms. In response to this crisis Oxfam, Traidcraft, Equal Exchange and Twin Trading
got together in 1991 and formed the branded fair trade coffee company, Cafédirect. All four
organisations were already involved in the distribution of fair trade coffee into the UK but
they realised that collectively they could achieve so much more:
“Our contribution to Cafédirect was that we were the only member who had any marketing
experience. Twin Trading had the coffee supply chain management, Oxfam had shops and
campaigners and Traidcraft had Traidcraft Reps.” (Founder of Equal Exchange and Director of
Cafédirect, 2002)
Cafédirect was born from this alliance of interested charities with one specific mission – to
pioneer fair trade into the mainstream of consumer consciousness and purchasing in the UK.
By 2007, Cafédirect had become the UK’s largest fair trade hot drinks company and the
fourth largest hot beverage company in the UK with a turnover of £22.3m in 2007, up 3%
year-on-year. Its brands include Cafédirect Coffee, Teadirect and Cocodirect which are sold
through both major supermarket chains and alternative channels of distribution, including
Oxfam shops. Cafédirect is the fifth largest coffee brand in the UK with a 7% market share of
the roasted and ground coffee market (Mintel, 2008) and sources coffee beans from 39
producer organisations across 13 different countries which means that over a 250,000 growers
benefit. Cafédirect’s product portfolio includes 15 coffee products (from roast and ground,
espresso, decaffeinated, organic to instant), 3 tea products and Cocodirect drinking chocolate.
Teadirect was launched in 1998 is now ranked ninth in the UK’s top tea brands and its sales
have grown 30% in the last year.
Cafédirect’s policy is to go further than just the FLO price standards outlined above by paying
an extra 10% at least above this Fairtrade© price; they call this their “Gold Standard”. For
example, tea prices fell from $1.60 to $1.35 per kg in Tanzania and as low as $1.18 in Uganda
during 2004 and 05, nonetheless Cafédirect bought at a minimum price of $1.95 per kg
(Cafédirect, 2005).
9Overall, in 2007 Cafédirect paid nearly £1.0 million above the market price for its coffee, tea
and cocoa raw materials (data demonstrated by a Marketing Manager at Cafédirect during
observation). The company has then paid a further £600,000 to its producer partners through
its Producer Partnership Programmes (PPP). These programmes consist of business
development training tailored to the needs of producer organisations supplying Cafédirect
with tea and coffee. They include building capabilities in marketing, quality control, crop
husbandry and crop diversification.
Cafédirect and the 3 phases of fair trade marketing
Cafédirect really entered the UK market in 1993 when Equal Exchange negotiated its first
major grocery retail contract to supply roast and ground (R&G) coffee to Safeway
Supermarket stores across Scotland. All of its products were carrying the Fairtrade© Mark;
this was the major breakthrough in fair trade that the founders were looking for. Shortly
afterwards, the Co-operative Retail Group, followed by Sainsbury’s, started stocking
Cafédirect R&G and, within 3 years, Cafédirect was available from most major UK retailers;
fair trade had moved away from just being sold in World Shops and was entering the
mainstream of UK grocery markets. Davies (2007) identifies mainstreaming as the third era
in the fair trade marketing evolution since inception:
 The Solidarity Era (~1970-1990) – Where fair traders tried to demonstrate their
solidarity with third world producers. This development can be considered as the genesis of
the marketing of sustainable products.
 The Market Development Era (1990 – 2002) - Where fair trade tried to shake its
charity image and compete openly on the market with quality products and using the
Fairtrade©Mark as a unique selling point
 The Mass-Market Era (2002-Date) – Where fair trade competes in the mainstream
with a wide range of fair trade brands positioned at differing pricing points and offering a
range of qualities (from budget to premium) and with a number of multinational coffee brands
who now include a fair trade brand in their portfolio. In each case, the brands are marketed
according to the unique social/environmental attributes they can display.
Cafédirect has followed similar stages in its marketing evolution to those outlined above since
its introduction in 1991. One of the main guiding principles for Cafédirect in the early days
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was that it had to shake the stigma associated with the poor quality ‘charity products’.
Consistent high product quality standards were seen by Cafédirect management as critical
because its benchmark competition was viewed as mainstream brands such as Nescafé
original, and Kenco medium roast. Since launch, Cafédirect has achieved this and has always
been viewed as premium quality brand with retail prices 20-30% above competition
throughout most of its brand lifecycle. Cafédirect argues that its investment in producer
organisations via PPP ensures that product quality is second to none across its three main
product lines. Its first major product line was R&G coffee; however, market research
revealed that the majority of UK consumers were drinking freeze dried coffee, so in 1994 it
launched a freeze dried instant coffee. This enabled the company to make its first profits in
1995 and heralded the start of Cafédirect’s strong growth which was continuously fuelled by
new product introductions. As such three years later, Cafédirect entered the tea market with
Teadirect and then, in 2002, Cocodirect drinking chocolate was launched using both fair trade
cocoa and sugar. Recently, they have released many gourmet single-source-of-origin coffees
(some of them organic), a range of premium instant coffees and specialist teas.
Bearing in mind Cafédirect’s strong brand name today, it is hard to imagine they have never
advertised on television. The company has even won the 2004 Marketer of the Year Award
from the Marketing Society on an official marketing budget of only £4,000 (less than 0.02%
of the total marketing spend in the industry). This has been achieved through the clever use of
partners, volunteers and network associates. Principally, PR, journalism and print advertising
have been the driving force behind Cafédirect’s marketing and advertising success. Through
these media, the three eras of the company’s marketing, advertising and packaging strategy is
clearly visible:
Fair Trade Solidarity: Marketing Ethics 1993 – 1999
Although the product quality has changed little over the years, the advertising, branding and
packaging has gone through some significant changes. Early packaging tended towards
simplicity but with large amounts of text telling customers about the product and the
producers (see Table 1). This fits well with a solidarity view of the products by bringing the
consumers and the producers closer together. It also supports the effort to market the ethics of
the product by informing customers of how “ethical” the product is.
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The poster campaigns during this 6 year period show farmers either suffering or
demonstrating pride (see Figure 2) and tended to contain a testimony and portray how buying
Cafédirect assists these coffee farmers and their communities. This ties in closely with
attempts to draw customers into feeling solidarity with producers and to begin the process of
demonstrating how Cafédirect provides a more ethical and sustainable alternative choice in
the coffee market.
Fair Trade Solidarity
1991-1999
Market Ethics
Mass-Market
2004-Present
Market Uniqueness
Market Development
1999-2003
Market Quality
Table1: Packaging Developments in the Cafédirect Brand Portfolio
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As brand recognition grew, Cafédirect became more controversial by suggesting that not only
was their coffee ethical but, by their very nature, the mainstream competition was not (see the
‘Whiff’ advert in Figure 3). Similarly, they attacked the “fat-cat” mentality of large
corporations as their ‘Has Been’ advert from the appropriately-titled 'edge' campaign shows
(also in Figure 3). In a stroke of creativity, ‘Has Been’ was powerfully displayed on the
Guardian's obituaries page on September 8th, 1997 which was otherwise entirely dedicated to
the main obituary for one of Africa's most corrupt dictators, Mobutu Sese Seke.
Figure 3: Ethical vs. unethical press campaigns
Figure 2: Solidarity poster and press campaigns
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One problem with this type of branding is its similarity to the charity aspect of fair trade and
the “poor quality” image of pre-Fairtrade© Mark products. Additionally, there is a perceived
limit within the fair trade community as to how much market share “core ethics” can gain a
company (Managing Director Divine Chocolate, interview 2004). This is considered to be
around 3% market share for cocoa and coffee in Europe (Managing Director Divine
Chocolate, interview 2003; CEO Cafédirect, interview 2007) and is evidenced by other fair
trade initiatives such as Max Havelaar3, Transfair4, Rättvisemärkt5 and Reilun Kaupan6 all of
which have struggled to grow beyond 3% market share.
Market Development: Marketing Quality 1999-2003
To push sales above this 3% level, Cafédirect changed its messages during 1999/2000,
portraying their branding in a more evocative format. The company created brands which
suggested high quality, premium coffees and teas by showing scenes from the environments
in which the commodities were produced (see packaging developments in Table 1 and the
newspaper advertisements in Figure 4 below) as opposed to portraits of subsistence coffee
farmers. They even changed the name of Cafédirect Instant to 5065 – the average height at
which their coffee beans were grown – to make a clear transition to the premium end of the
market.
Over the following two years, there was continued progress into new advertising methods and
media with the first, highly evocative cinema advertisement for any fair trade company in
which the peak of Machu Picchu (The face in the mountain in the poster below) rises up at the
smell of the coffee. In another first, Cafédirect was granted advertising rights on the London
Underground for its new brand 5065 during this period.
Figure 4: Market development evocative and quality image campaigns
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The main purpose of Cafédirect’s new advertising and packaging was to move the focus away
from the grower (or the “core ethics” message previously used) to the experience of the
consumer. Consequently, there was a major reduction in the amount of fair trade text on the
packaging and advertising, with grower testimonies becoming 3-line sound bites rather than
stories. There was even talk of dropping the Fairtrade© Mark altogether as Cafédirect had
higher brand awareness than the Mark itself. Although this did not occur, the space given over
to the Mark was distinctly reduced. The impact of this new, customer experience message was
to spark a rapid growth in sales and much greater brand awareness and market share rising
above the 3% barrier.
As each product was rebranded to reflect its new positioning, the company began to have a
new problem. Although sales had been increasing for a number of years in each category and
the brands were considered quality premium products, they each needed their own marketing
and sales support which led to rapidly increasing costs in slowly growing markets.
Competitors also began to follow their lead by rebranding and adopting product quality
messages. The market has also seen a vast increase in the number of fair trade brands on the
supermarket shelf, including premium coffees from major roasters, budget own-label brands
from supermarkets and fair trade lines from Nestlé (and similarly branded “sustainable”
coffee from Kenco). Competitive advantage from the “core ethics” of the product was being
eroded and with trusted brands bringing out quality products, the quality message was no
longer as effective. The impact was Cafédirect’s revenues and growth had begun to shrink.
Market research undertaken by Cafédirect suggested that consumers were not aware that its
coffees, teas and cocoas came from the same organisation, meaning that Cafédirect could not
leverage the success of its coffee to sell newer products (interview in 2007 with former CEO
at Cafédirect, 1998-2008). The CEO also confirmed that now the quality of the brand was
publicly recognised and with more competitors matching this quality, the main differentiator
for the organisation needs to change:
“The key strength identified was our relationships with producers which demonstrated our values
and integrity. The research showed that our stakeholders want us to shout about these relationships
by symbolising through producer stories showing the impact of these fair trade relationships. This
should be at the heart of our values resulting in a trusted brand, dividends and social/environmental
benefits for producers.”
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With product quality now established, it became the organisational values and Cafédirect’s
corporate brand communications that would influence sales growth and help reduce
marketing expenditure. Beginning in 2004, , Cafédirect undertook a corporate product and re-
branding programme which culminated in 2007 with its brand portfolio being presented as a
family of related products.
Mass-Markets: Marketing Uniqueness 2004-present
In making this move, the company departed from product brand marketing towards corporate
brand marketing –or a “branded house” in the parlance- to communicate how uniqueness of
Cafédirect across its range of brands.
The company can justifiably claim a range of innovations which makes it unique: the first fair
trade company to advertise, the innovator of the first fair trade instant coffee and the first fair
trade company to have an initial public offering (IPO). It can also identify a number of
market initiatives such setting up as the Gold Standard where not only does the company pay
the fair trade premium to growers, but it also pays an additional premium for grower
development initiatives. Cafédirect has invested £1.9 million or 60% of operating profit into
Producer Partner Programmes in the 3 years to 2007. Since its IPO in 2004, it have also
handed over a portion of its share issue to the producer community - 4.9 % of equity - in order
to give producers a role in the governance of the organisation.
The company now attempts to leverage stories of sustainability and shared ownership in its
marketing communications as reasons why people should preferentially buy “Brand
Cafédirect” over other competing products. As a consequence, Cafédirect’s physical
products are no longer featured in today’s advertising.
The transition to corporate marketing communications based on uniqueness has been a
gradual process. In many ways, there has always been an undercurrent of this but over the last
5 years, the vast majority of Cafédirect’s advertising has been based on “events” and big
extravaganzas. Examples of this include the extent to which they have involved themselves
with the Glastonbury Rock Festival and the Edinburgh Fringe. One major investment has
been on “The Lift” (pictured in Figure 5a with the comedy group The Pineapple Boys) which
is a miniature entertainment venue where small audiences (as many as will fit) are treated to
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live entertainment. It is quite literally a lift making the Cafédirect ‘experience’ somewhat
avant-garde and a magnet for drawing press attention.
Figure 5b: Uniqueness: A selection of press coverage of Cafédirect’s
marketing activities
Figure 5a: The Lift
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Following on from the Lift as a venue, Cafédirect took over the London Eye in 2005 with
each pod representing a venue for entertainers (following the example of The Lift). Samples
of press coverage from Cafédirect’s annual report in that year are shown in Figure 5b. Figure
5b also shows a Daily Mirror front cover with the transformation of Madonna into an African
woman in a major piece of PR for Cafédirect:
Brand Location in Store
Supermarkets were one of the first commercial business customers to expand the sales of fair
trade and to validate Cafédirect as an alternative, mass-market business model rather than a
niche offering. However, this distribution channel in itself threw up some business and ethical
problems. Many people within the fair trade movement believed that working with
supermarkets was hypocritical. When trying to demonstrate a better way of trading and
supporting growers, working with organisations famous for their tight financial control over
suppliers was regarded as questionable. In addition, to ensure sales were high enough to keep
them on the supermarket stocking list meant encouraging existing consumers to move away
from the independent and highly supportive World Shops to buy Cafédirect products at their
local supermarkets. At the same time, the company also had to create awareness of their range
among supermarket shoppers quickly and to persuade them to buy their products. Convincing
campaigners to stand outside supermarkets and talk to people into buying fair trade on a one-
to-one basis was certainly not unusual. In fact, during those early days, Cafédirect was lucky
enough to have a group of devoted volunteer campaigners willing to brave wet February
mornings during the Fairtrade Fortnight, an annual event aimed at raising fair trade
awareness, to promote its brand. Many of these supporters were from the partner
organisations Oxfam and Traidcraft.
Rather surprisingly, one of the biggest challenges faced by Cafédirect was to get its products
situated appropriately in store. A great deal of confusion existed (and in some cases it still
does) as to what fair trade actually is! Many supermarkets stack their fair trade ranges on
shelves displaying such things as Organics, Health foods and Ethnic produce. In fact, the aim
with most Fairtrade© Marked brands has always been for them to sit alongside the
mainstream brands and not elsewhere as an ethical, niche brand. By the time Cafédirect was
creating tea brands in the late 1990s, ethical consumers were no longer its target market.
Convincing every supermarket shopper that fair trade was simply a better way of consuming
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became the new mantra. Thus, wherever the mainstream brands were sold, Cafédirect wanted
to be there too.
In 2000, Cafédirect entered into a partnership with Costa Coffee to sell fair trade coffee as a
menu option throughout their estate of UK coffee shops. This market sector is termed “out-of-
home” and, in recent years, has been the strongest growth sector for Cafédirect, with them
enjoying sales of £4.6m in 2007 from a base of around £0.5m five years earlier. New
products developed for vending machines and catering packs for cafes, restaurants, planes and
trains are the key reasons behind this growth.
Thus, Cafédirect’s approach to distribution has been a vital element in shifting fair trade
products into mainstream consumption. The company was able to convince trade buyers and
consumers alike that it is not just a niche brand but a mass-market competitor with a unique
selling proposition. How this message has been successfully communicated over time is of
critical importance for Cafédirect. For a relatively new company with a workforce that has
never risen above 35 people, this is a bold marketing and sales position to have adopted and
has been achieved by giving the impression of size through its extensive use of networks.
Cafédirect’s Networks through its Business Development Cycle
Cafédirect were founded as a joint venture between four organisations with different
capabilities. With Twin Trading as their supply chain partner, they needed no buyers or
supply chain managers (or plantations for that matter). In fact, Cafédirect was, and still is, a
virtual organisation. Currently, Keith Spicer7 manufacture, package and distribute their teas
and Gala8 roast, grind, package and distribute their coffees. This enables Cafédirect to remain
small and entirely marketing and demand management focused. It has meant that the
company can appear to the market as a much larger organisation than it is through the use of
existing business networks and links to the market. This has given the company greater
credibility and market impact despite only being a small, entrepreneurial business. Over its
business development cycle, Cafédirect has gone through three distinct stages in its network
usage which reflect its marketing developments previously discussed.
1. The solidarity launch stage: Cafédirect’s business network
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During its launch, most of Cafédirect’s partners were from an Alternative Trading
Organisation (ATO) background. All of the supply chain, sales and marketing was conducted
by other organisations, in particular, Cafédirect’s founding partners. Even manufacturers like
Northern Tea Merchants had long-standing relationships with fair trade having been the
manufacturer of Equal Exchange and Traidcraft coffee prior to Cafédirect’s involvement (see
Figure 6). This network is consistent with the marketing and branding of Cafédirect during
the fair trade solidarity period.
2. Cafédirect’s business network during its market development growth phase
During this growth stage, Cafédirect began to assume more responsibility for sales and
marketing, taking away the initiative from its founding partners. The company also started to
rely less on ATOs for retailing its products or advertising its brands as they move more
towards traditional style advertising, such as posters and print adverts, and mass-market
distributors. They also partnered with Coffee Fresh9 for vending machine distribution and had
an agreement with Costa Coffee to ensure distribution in the growing market for coffee shops.
In order to develop the market for both its own brands and the fair trade category in general,
distribution was widened and Cafédirect’s marketing and sales resources were increased by
introducing more commercial partners into the network and reducing its commitments to the
ATOs (see Figure 7).
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Figure 6: Cafédirect’s Original Business Network
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3. Cafédirect’s current business network during its mass-market stage
Currently, there is a clear shift away from the company’s original fair trade founders to other
types of trading partners (both commercial and ATOs) as it competes in the mass-market. In
promoting and advertising the brand, Cafédirect has sought to develop increasingly avant-
garde partners, such as the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, Glastonbury Rock Festival, G8, and
organisations including the London Eye and the Guardian Newspaper (who now hold a board
seat) in order to gain significant levels of free advertising space (or a very much reduced cost)
in prime locations (including newspaper front covers, festival stages and endorsements). The
company has also begun to involve itself in many issues beyond the fair trade agenda, such as
contributing to the climate change debate with partner GTZ, getting involved in the Sri
Lankan Tsunami Appeal and the Kenyan civil strife following the 2008 election. The senior
management of Cafédirect are also now consulting with The Department for International
Development (DfID) on health and poverty issues in Africa (see Figure 8 for Cafédirect’s
current business networks). Arguably, this strategy once again starts to push the company
back towards the charity-style public image they once tried so hard to cast off. However, one
of the differences now is that the people involved in the company are no longer ATO workers
with experience working in Africa (as they were in the beginning), but former sales and
marketing managers from GlaxoSmithKline, Mars and Nestlé and other multinationals.
Over time, Cafédirect has effected very significant changes in the type of companies it
networks with and the ways in which these networks are leveraged. Originally, a high
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Figure 7: Cafédirect’s market development network
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proportion of its network contacts were charities, Alternative Trading Organisations and
“ethical” companies manufacturing and distributing through alternative retailers. All of whom
partnered with Cafédirect as part of a transformative movement to build an alternative to
conventional international trade, ultimately leading to the presence of Cafédirect on
supermarket shelves and movement into the mainstream. For example, for many years,
Fairtrade Fortnight (as mentioned earlier) was the principle means of promotion. For two
weeks each year, all the licensed members of the Fairtrade Foundation join together to
promote one common message; an effective method of promoting the idea of size and
cohesion which really does not exist across the fair trade market. PR contacts and volunteer
sales forces were also key to the network in the early stages. To a certain extent, this original
marketing strategy was driven by cost because, as a small business, Cafédirect could not
afford expensive sales and marketing. Also, weight was added to Cafédirect’s sustainability
claims by using church groups and other charities to advertise their products.
Now, the influence of the founding partners of the company has been significantly reduced.
For instance, Equal Exchange the original sales and marketing team for Cafédirect, is no
longer involved in running the company. Shortly after moving to London, Cafédirect
effectively curtailed its relationship by only allowing them to act as the distributor for
Cafédirect brands into the catering, health and wholefood markets. Within a couple of years,
the company had effectively by-passed even this arrangement with Equal Exchange by
agreeing to supply direct to their biggest customer (Suma). Cafédirect has not only reduced its
use of the founders’ sales and marketing teams, it has also begun to formalise their
relationships with them by using service level agreements in place of the trust-based
agreements. At precisely the same time as these events, Cafédirect converted from private to
public ownership, reducing each of the founding partners from 25% share to 10% share in the
company and reducing their position on the Board to one representative.
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Cafédirect has moved away from the ATOs to more traditional business partners such as
BridgeThorne (outsourced retails sales and distribution), Coffee fresh (vending machines) and
selling directly to Suma (major warehouse and distribution centres for independent retailers.
As the range of partners that Cafédirect works with increases dramatically, they are beginning
to look more like any other small coffee business as they make connections to advance the
commercial aspects of the firm whilst concentrating less on the ethical image they had
portrayed in the past.
Cafédirect: Where to next?
Cafédirect has been a huge marketing success story. They have consistently grown far faster
than the total market although not necessarily as fast as some competitors (see Table 2). In
2008, the former CEO was made an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE10)
Award, after overseeing the vastly over-subscribed initial public offering for Cafédirect in
2004. Cafédirect paid its first dividend in 2005- much too many investors’ surprise -despite
the increase pressures from competition and was also voted number one most-recommended
UK brand by a Millward Brown consumer market survey in 2007.
Growers
- Keith Spicer
- Gala
Twin
Trading
Cafédirect
Suma
Fairtrade
Fortnight
PRCafédirect Owners
Equal Exchange 10%
Twin Trading 10%
Oxfam 10%
Traidcraft 10%
Private 60%
PostersCoffee Fresh
Endorsement
Event
Sponsorship
Event
Management
Print Ads.
Airplanes and Airports
Cafes Restaurants
Caterers
Cafédirect Coffee Bars
Non-Trading Partners
GTZ (climate control program)
Guardian Newspaper (hold a board seat)
Divine Chocolate (Sister Company)
DfID (Consultation Partner)
Key: Commercial Partner
Alternative Trading Organisations and charities
Supply chain
Manufacture /
Distribution Marketing Retailers
Advertising /
promotionSales
World Shops
Supermarkets
Charity Shops
Health / Whole food
Mail Order
Independents Grocers
BridgeThorne
Figure 8: Cafédirect’s current business network
23
In 2006, the company made its first after-tax loss since 1995(see financial results in Figure 9).
During 2007, retail sales actually fell 4% for the first time in the company’s history to £17.0
million which must be viewed with some concern as 70% of total company turnover is via the
retail channel. Fairtrade© coffee at retail level overall is still growing at 33% volume and
24% retail (Fairtrade Foundation, 2008); Cafédirect does not seem to be capitalising on this
and is also feeling the effects of increasing competition from both like-for-like fair trade
goods, including supermarket own-label fair trade products, and new, sustainable coffees.
Table 2:Market share (by value) of coffee by manufacturer: 2003-07
Company £m £m £m
%
change
%
change
2003 2005 2007 2003-07 2005-07
Nestlé 294 308 304 3.4 -1.3
Kraft 126 128 139 10.3 8.6
Douwe Egberts 27 40 47 74.1 17.5
Cafédirect 7 8 10 28.6 12.5
Taylors 8 8 10 37.5 37.5
Lavazza 8 8 11 37.5 37.5
Gala (Lyons) 6 5 4 -33.3 -20
Food Brands Group (Percol) 5 5 5 0 0
Own-label 88 104 122 38.6 17.3
Others 44 56 68 54.5 21.4
Total 613 670 720 17.5 7.5
Source: Adapted from Mintel 2008
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For instance, thirty nine percent of fair trade coffee sales are now accounted for by
supermarket own-label brands. In fact, forecast data for Fairtrade© coffee in general does not
look encouraging with a gradual slowing of growth which could reduce even faster if the
2006/ 2007 trend continues (see Figure 10, long-dash line). Since 2005 Cafédirect have
actually underperformed in terms of growth compared to fair trade in general (Fairtrade
growth rate = 8% per year, Cafédirect growth rate = 6-7% per year), they have also grown
relatively conservatively compared to the rest of the coffee market (Figure 10), Similarly,
although the predicted growth in coffee shops is still strong (bold line), this growth is
definitely slowing too, indicating near-saturated markets in both retail and out-of-home coffee
consumption. This could be an issue for Cafédirect as they have recently started investing in
their own high street coffee shops to take advantage of this growing market.
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Figure 9: Cafédirect’s Financial Results
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There is also a problem in the target age group for coffee consumption amongst the
demographic group called the Thirdage (hashed line of Figure 10) as there is actually a
predicted fall in this age bracket of people 45 years and older. This may have a double impact
on Cafédirect as fair trade itself is more attractive to Thirdage consumers than other
demographic groups (Nichols and Opal, 2005; Strong, 1996; 1997). Taken together, these
market predictions adversely impact on the overall market forecast for coffee sales (short-
dash line), making coffee a far less attractive market than it was a few years ago.
Through its current and past networks, Cafédirect has been able to convince their stakeholders
that it is a much larger business than it really is. It has been able to cast off its charity image
for a professionalism not seen previously in fair trade companies, and has exploited just about
every opportunity to expand its public profile whilst growing its contacts at governmental,
industrial and consumer levels. Cafédirect now buys from 39 producer organisations
representing over 250,000 growers from 13 different countries (Cafédirect, 2007), and the fair
trade movement is now generally recognised as an alternative approach to traditional trading
models (Moore, 2004; Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Raynolds et al, 2007). However, competing
ethical claim certification marks are now entering the market (e.g. Rainforest Alliance11, Utz
Kapeh12 and the coffee industry’s 4C code) which is introducing greater competition. On the
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Figure 10: Market Growth Forecasts relevant to Cafédirect
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positive side, it emerges that a major UK supermarket has delisted Nescafé Partners Blend
due to poor sales. A supermarket buyer offered the opinion that, “fair trade consumers just do
not seem to trust the Nestlé brand” (interviewed in February 2009).
In the face of this increasing market threats, we are seeing the current Cafédirect management
team expanding its ethical message by engaging in broader issues such as ethical
consumption, overseas development aid and human rights issues….. as well as climate change
through its involvement with DfID and GTZ.
The company has also to deal with the negative publicity about fair trade that appears in the
press from time to time, such as the accusation that fair trade is not living up to its promises to
growers or that it is been subverted by multinational organisations (Nestlé “Partners’ Blend”
being awarded the Fairtrade© Mark). Fair trade organisations are sometimes criticised for
‘colluding’ with the supermarkets by ‘agreeing to’ the profit levels supermarkets achieve on
fair trade products (BBC, 2006). Cafédirect has even been accused of destabilising the market
by swimming counter to market economics, representing nothing more than protectionism
and, as such, damaging free trade across the whole coffee market (Kappler, 2001, CBI and
British Soluble Coffee Manufacturers’ Association in The Guardian, 1998, p.22). However
this argument assumes that free trade was working in the first place. For small-scale coffee
farmers receiving less for their product than it has cost them to produce sustainably, it’s hard
to see how this can work for such communities (Brown, 1993).
Conclusions
As a case study, this paper attempts to explain Cafédirect’s rise from obscurity to become the
champion brand of the fair trade movement in the UK. Through the use of networks and the
ways in which the company leverages its Fairtrade© status demonstrates great creativity and
ingenuity which can be generally characterised as an aggressive, market-orientated approach.
However, the case also presents a microcosm of the issues surrounding ethical brand
management. Cafédirect could only rely on core product ethics (being fair trade) and ethical
messages to deliver a very limited market share. Product quality and corporate identity,
combined with strong distribution and consumer awareness, have proved more important in
achieving a greater market share and sales growth; Cafédirect has had to adapt its business
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model and core messaging to reflect this. The people within the organisation have also had to
adapt to these changing market conditions.
Despite the flexibility of the Cafédirect management and the companies strong brand
credentials, it is facing a number of challenges as a result of mainstreaming. Its first challenge
is to maintain its unique ethical edge. Although Cafédirect today is more heavily sales driven
than the charities and ATOs that founded the organisation were, is it fair to argue that its
engagement with mainstream business has led to a dilution of the fair trade movement (Lowe
and Davenport 2005a, 2005b, Moore et al 2006, Murray et al 2006, Taylor et al 2005)?
Certainly, Cafédirect’s structures and processes for selling its products are not particularly
different to any other mainstream consumer business. Nevertheless, its ownership and
engagement with supply chain development issues through PPP and Gold Standard suggest
that its claim to be the authentic voice for subsistence growers is certainly as strong today as it
always has been. However, the company is now competing against other organisations within
the fair trade movement, unlike in earlier times where all fair trade companies presented a
united front (Davies, 2007). Especially if the coffee market goes the way of the chocolate
market where big brand leaders ( in this case Cadbury’s) convert their mainstream brands to
fair trade. To a certain extent, this forces the company to adopt a defensive strategy to help
protect its brand and it’s now not insubstantial revenues. It is telling that the new CEO
(formerly from Ribena) is an experienced consumer goods marketer, skilled in protecting
market share rather than an entrepreneur experienced at growing an ethical business.
The second challenge faced by Cafédirect in mainstreaming is whether or not it is clean-
washing its partner organisations (Murray and Raynolds, 2000; Golding and Peattie, 2005;
Valor, 2006). Unlike its sister company Divine Chocolate, Cafédirect does not directly license
its products to other organisations for own-label production. It does, however, provide the
opportunity for organisations in its network partnership to gain reputational benefits whilst
contributing very little to the movement. An extreme example of this is an airline
demonstrating commitment to sustainability by having fair trade coffee on-board, perhaps in
an attempt to deflect attention from other environmental issues.
The third challenge may be about survival of the company rather than promoting development
of the fair trade movement. Ultimately, Cafédirect is one of the companies that set the
standards for what fair trade has become. This case demonstrates that if the movement wishes
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to have a large market presence, it has to embrace a mainstream approach. Fair trade has
gravitated towards being heavily brand-orientated in competitive market segments which
effectively negate the notion of being a united movement. Within these segments, brands
must fight for market position which means there may well be limits to size since as soon as
the market segment becomes big and profitable enough, large commercial brands can quickly
enter and draw a larger share of that market. (Currently, the FLO does not limit the number of
licenses available to suitable applicants). Whilst it is possible to sustain a number 1 or 2 brand
position within a segment, ultimately, company survival and profitability depends upon
occupying multiple market segments (Aaker, 2004); niche brands are usually viable within a
mainstream market segment but niche companies are not.
The final challenge raised in this case is whether consumers can variously differentiate
between not only competing ethical claims (i.e. the new ethical labels) but also the number of
claims that they can willingly process. Moore et al. (2006) calls for fair trade to show unity in
fair trade messaging to ensure its survival as a distinct product offering. At Cafédirect, there
has been a movement towards corporate ethics as its unique differentiator leading to an
involvement in numerous ethical activities and promoting this engagement over a broader
series of sustainability issues. Davies and Crane (2003) discussed the idea of ring-fencing the
fair trade ideology behind a “moral curtain” and really promoting that message over all other
activities. In writing this case, we cannot readily identify whether Cafédirect’s corporate
marketing activities about its various positions on global ethical issues is having an impact on
the slowing of sales growth since there are too many other factors at play in the market.
However, evidence from Mintel (2008) would suggest the majority of customers are not
sufficiently savvy to comprehend multiple messages on ethical or sustainability issues (e.g.
confusing organics and fair trade).
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Appendix 1: Methodology
The data used in this case study come from two longitudinal, exploratory studies into the
management and implementation of strategy in Cafédirect over the periods of 1999-2004 and
1999-2008 respectively.
The methodology used in both studies involved the researchers gaining privileged access to
the company to develop a deep understanding of the organisational phenomena (Glaser,
1992). A case study approach was, therefore, selected as the principal method of gaining in-
depth information (Yin, 1994). Data sources were wide ranging, including not only primary
qualitative data (observation, interviews and attendance at corporate events) but also annual
reports, company reports, secondary data, and statistics and surveys providing information of
relevance to the study (Goulding, 2001). These supplementary data sources provide some of
the background as well as further verification of our findings from the qualitative works.
Nevertheless, the methods of enquiry are predominantly qualitative in order to gain this rich
contextual understanding to promote revelatory case insight (Mintzberg, 1979, and Van
Maanan, 1979).
The predominant qualitative methods used in each study were:
Study 1 - participant and personal observation recorded through formal and reflexive research
diaries spanning a period of nine years and semi-structured interview technique;
Study 2 - participant observation included work shadowing in the sales and marketing
department, touring with the marketing team at public events such as the Edinburgh Fringe
Festival and The Lift venues (see later), participation in team and external / network
organisation meetings and working from the head office on marketing and research activities
and semi-structure interviews.
In total, the observation leads to over 1000 hours contact time over the two studies as well as
informal observation from the authors’ cumulative experience of 20 years working within and
observing the fair trade movement.
The semi-structured interviews also carried out consisted of 12 formal interviews within
Cafédirect and 42 supplementary and validating interviews across the marketplace, from
supply chain participants to the fair trade establishment. Key informants include past and
present personnel at Cafédirect, the company’s founders, the Fairtrade Foundation, other fair
30
trade companies, competitors, supermarket buyers, supermarket ethical trading managers, a
trading manager from a UK Coffee shop chain and established independent retailers. All
interviews were recorded.
To ensure internal validity and reliability, a constant comparative method borrowed from
grounded theory was utilised for both studies collectively (Barnes, 1996) multiple responses
from different people within the same organisation were compared against each other, field
notes and secondary sources. We subsequently interpreted these data outputs and provided
underlying rationales for the companies actions from the data (Rubin and Rubin, 1995,
Eisenhardt, 1989). External validity and reliability was increased through triangulation with
both secondary sources and formal interviews with appropriate third parties (such as network
partners) to ensure greater rigour in the findings and conclusions (Askey and Knight 1999).
Interviews were transcribed and run through a series of categorisation, abstraction, and
comparison processes to identify themes which contribute to theory development (Spiggle,
1994). Aspects of theory were then reviewed iteratively to decide on the direction of future
data collection and emergent themes were then put to participants for review and refinement
prior to writing this final version of the case study.
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Appendix 2: Teaching Appendix
Suggested Questions:
Do you think companies in an ethical niche have to compromise their ethics when competing
in the mainstream?
Looking back at Cafédirect’s market development, would you have done things differently if
you had been in charge? If you were to have been offered the CEO role in 2008 when it
became available, what would you do differently at Cafédirect?
For Business Ethics Course:
a) Cafédirect has been a clear success and is held up as an archetype case for “ethical
business”, but is it really any different from other competitors that enjoys a unique selling
proposition? Has fair trade reached its natural limit when codes such as the 4C (Common
Code for the Coffee Community - http://www.4c-coffeeassociation.org/en/association.htm)
are put in place to govern the entire coffee market with similar rhetoric to the Fairtrade©
principles?
b) As a marketing and logistics company, what should Cafédirect’s responsibilities be?
Consider:
i. Are they an appropriate organisation to be advising the government on African
development?
ii. Should they be getting involved in climate change discussions or is this diluting their
core purpose?
iii. Can single issue brands still compete in an ever more complex and diversified
market?
For Marketing Ethics Course:
Discussion:
Davies and Crane (2003) discuss the idea of a “Moral Curtain” where, by ring fencing a
single issue (the marginalisation of growing communities) and really promoting this, fair
trade companies can achieve success over time by allowing other areas of the business to
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mimic traditional business models whilst the company itself remains perceived as an
“ethical brand”.
Has this been happening in Cafédirect? Does an involvement in ancillary campaigns, such as
climate change, weaken their market proposition?
For Marketing Course:
You have been appointed as the new Marketing Director of Cafédirect with the specific brief
to get both profits and sales back on track. Your brief allows you to consider all aspects of
the company’s business and marketing strategy and there are no ‘no go’ areas. Fortuitously,
one of the world’s leading marketing services company has offered their extensive market
research resources to you for free – both qualitative and quantitative –as part of their global
sustainability programme. So, as a first step in managing change in Cafédirect’s marketing
strategy, you decide to draw up a MR brief for the agency. Your brief should highlight the
key aspects of the business and market you want to investigate. What do you consider to be
the five key areas where research insight is most needed to develop your revised marketing
strategy?
Business Strategy courses:
From the case, identify the tangible and intangible resources utilised by Cafedirect to support
its competitive position in the UK Hot Beverage market?
Further Reading:
If you are interested in getting a greater understanding of fair trade, mainstreaming of fair
trade or wish to explore some of the issues covered in this case further, please refer to the
following suggested texts:
Taylor, L, P.; Murray, L, D. and Raynolds, T, L.: 2005, ‘Keeping Trade fair: Governance
challenges in the Fair Trade coffee initiative’, Sustainable Development, 13, 199-208
Tallontire, A.: 2000, ‘Partnerships in fair trade: reflections from a case study of Cafédirect’
Development in Practice, 10(2): 166-177
Low, W. and Davenport, E.: 2006. ‘Mainstreaming Fair Trade: Adoption, assimilation,
appropriation’, Journal of Strategic Marketing, 14(4), 315-328.
Raynolds L. T., Murray, D. and Taylor, P.L.: 2004, ‘Fair trade coffee: Building producer
capacity via global networks’, Journal of International Development, 16(8), 1109–1121.
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Davies, I.A.: 2008, ‘Alliances and networks: Creating success in the UK fair trade market’,
Journal of Business Ethics, (Forthcoming) DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9762-8
Doherty, B. and Tranchell, S.: 2007, ‘“Radical Mainstreaming” of fair trade: the case of the
Day Chocolate Company’, Equal Opportunities International, 26(7), 693-703.
Moore, G, Gibbon, J and Slack, R.: 2006, ‘The mainstreaming of Fair Trade: a
macromarketing perspective’, Journal of Strategic Marketing, 12(4), 329-352
Moore, G.: 2004, ‘The fair trade movement: parameters, issues and future research’ Journal
of Business Ethics, 53 (1-2), 73-87.
Notes
1 The terms “South” and “North”, most often used in the literature on fair trade, correspond to a geopolitical
division of the world, between respectively “developing countries” and “industrialised countries”.
2 Mainstreaming refers to the broadening of distribution channels to compete directly with traditional business
organisations and brands by placing fair trade products wherever you would expect to see the leading brand
names.
3 Fairtrade Coffee originally but now the mark for fairtrade in Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, France, Denmark
and Norway
4 National Fairtrade Mark in Germany and Luxemburg
5 National Fairtrade Mark in Sweden
6 National Fairtrade Mark in Finland
7 Keith Spicer is a British tea blender, and coffee roaster and grinder (founded in 1934) which manufactures both
its own brand but also many branded coffees from many famous brands. It is a Soil Association organic-awarded
manufacturer and also deals with both fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance “sustainable” coffees
8 Gala is the UK’s biggest roaster and grinder and makes many UK coffee brands including Lyons and Mill
House
9 Coffee Fresh are providers of out-of-home vending machines for offices and public services
10 This is a prestigious award for service to the British Empire bestowed by the Queen and is two steps below
being Knighted (i.e. made a Sir or Dame).
11 A labelling scheme for coffee produced without rainforest destruction (used by Kenco and The Eden Project)
12 An almost direct competitor to Fairtrade in the coffee market guaranteeing more money will be passed back to
farmers
13 A code of conduct created by the world 4 biggest coffee roast and grinders in response to Fairtrade that
promises many of the same advantages as Fairtrade, but without any auditing or requirements on which to judge
compliance
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